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Abstract 
 
The relevance of projection bias in decision making processes has been widely studied, 
but not specifically in experimental auctions. We study the role of projection bias in 
experimental auctions by examining the bidding behavior of hungry and non-hungry 
subjects on food products delivered either immediately after the auction or in one week’s 
time. Results indicate that the difference in bids between a hot state (hunger) and a cold 
state (satiation) almost doubles when subjects have to predict their future tastes versus 
when they bid for a product intended for immediate consumption. More specifically, 
when subjects have to predict their future willingness to pay from their current tastes, 
they tend to over-predict their hunger and under-predict satiation.  
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Introduction 
Microeconomic theory posits that consumers accurately predict their future utility when 
solving their intertemporal optimization problems. However, accurately predicting future 
tastes requires that consumers understand both the direction and magnitude of how their 
tastes might change (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). Unfortunately, 
consumers do not always accurately predict these changes in their tastes and preferences. 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) coined the term “projection bias” to 
describe the general bias that has been documented in relation to the prediction of future 
tastes.  
One type of projection bias that occurs is when individuals fail to adequately 
predict future conditions that influence their current decisions. For example, customers 
ordering catalog clothes are overly influenced by the current weather (e.g., warm clothes 
orders jump significantly in cold weather and are then returned afterwards) (Conlin, 
O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang 2007); the sales of expensive and lasting goods, such as 
cars and houses, are also affected by the weather conditions at the time of the decision 
(Busse et al. 2012); “irrational” variables have been shown to have an effect on prices in 
eBay purchases (Mahatma 2006); people aroused by hunger, sex, or anger mispredict 
how they would act in a “calmer” state and, similarly, when they are in a cool state, 
mispredict the influence of arousal (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). In the 
field of medical science, patients who are in a state of fear or anxiety due to receipt of an 
adverse test result might need to make important treatment decisions with consequences 
that will apply after they have calmed down (Loewenstein 2005). In all of these 
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examples, if the decisions apply to the present situation, then there should be no 
(projection) bias; whereas decisions applying to later times but made under current 
conditions can be subject to projection bias. In other words, people are likely to misjudge 
their future conditions and make decisions that differ from what they would if the future 
condition was equal to the current condition.  
Projection bias is evident in the food domain as well. Hungry shoppers tend to 
buy different food items than non-hungry shoppers and their consumption pattern 
resembles that of people who expect to remain permanently famished (Mela, Aaron, and 
Gatenby 1997; Nisbett and Kanouse 1968). Hence, willingness to pay (WTP) for food 
products of hungry and non-hungry shoppers could vary as well depending on their 
hunger state. However, Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson (2002) found that if hungry shoppers 
were given a small piece of food (e.g., a muffin) right before entering a food market, they 
were able to limit their shopping to the initial items on a shopping list (Gilbert, Gill, and 
Wilson 2002). This documented bias is particularly important since the decision results 
may then carry on into subsequent periods. In this case, projection bias can be closely 
related to the lasting consequences of current decisions. For example, Read and Van 
Leeuwen (1998) presented office workers a choice of healthy and non-healthy snacks 
(fruit vs. candy bars) to be delivered in a week’s time, either at a time when they were 
expected to be hungry or full. The workers chose the candy bar when they were expected 
to be hungry (since snacks are considered more satiating; see Jack, Piacentini, and 
Schröder 1997). In addition, if they were hungry at the moment of the buying decision, 
they were also more likely to choose the candy bar for any other subsequent occasion 
they were presented a choice.  
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Although the concept of projection bias as coined by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, 
and Rabin (2003) has been studied in the literature, there are no known papers dealing 
with projection bias in experimental auction settings where the objective is to examine 
people’s valuation for specific products (i.e., eliciting homegrown values). This is in part 
expected, given that most experiments auction products either for immediate 
consumption or immediate purchase. But what if consumers have to project their current 
preferences on a future date due to a variety of reasons such as current satiation? How 
would that reflect on their valuation for a product and thus their current decision to bid 
for the product? When studying willingness to pay for food, in experimental auctions, 
consumption is typically immediate, indicating there would be no projection bias. 
However, if the goal is to learn about food purchasing behavior, consumers are often 
faced with making a current decision for future consumption (i.e. purchasing groceries 
for a week’s time period). Failure to account for projection bias could then render biased 
decisions i.e., basing their decision on a hot state with the potential to regret later. In our 
experiments, the difference in bids between a hot state and a cold state almost doubles 
when subjects have to project their tastes in one week’s time.  
In this article, we attempt to shed some light on the potential of the existence of 
projection bias in experimental auctions by auctioning food products that are intended for 
delivery and consumption either in the present or at a future date. We propose two central 
hypotheses that serve as the basis for the subsequent discussion: 1) depending on the 
hunger status (hungry or not), subjects will reveal different valuations for the same 
product; that is, will place greater valuation for the food product when hungry; and 2) 
irrespective of their hunger status, subjects who expect to receive the food product at a 
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future date will have lower valuations for the product given the uncertainty they face in 
accurately predicting whether their future tastes will resemble their current tastes. We test 
these hypotheses by conducting experimental auctions at different points in time during 
the day (to vary hunger levels) with the food product to be received at varying times 
(immediately after the auction or with a time lag). Additionally, when the product is 
being given in the future, subjects will have to pay either in advance (at the end of the 
auction) or at the moment of receipt of the sandwich. Our results have significant 
implications for experimental auction designs. 
 
Procedure 
 
To explore the effect of projection bias on product valuation, we designed an experiment 
to test whether mistaken inferences about whether current states will also be felt at future 
points in time would appear as an effect on a subject’s WTP for a perishable food 
product. First, we exogenously varied hunger levels by having subjects bid for a 
perishable food product (which was expected to be consumed right after the auction and 
not saved for the future) in two different times of the day when we expected subjects to 
be hungry or satiated. Half of the subjects participated in an auction before lunch time 
and half of the subjects participated in an auction after lunch time. Since we could not 
control whether a subject would be hungry or full at any given time (e.g., a subject may 
have decided to skip lunch or, conversely, to eat a satiating snack before lunch time), we 
also asked subjects about the time since their last meal. Comparing bids from the before-
lunch and after-lunch sessions allows us to get an estimate of the effect of hunger on 
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WTP. To test if hunger levels would have an effect (if any) on projection bias, in half of 
the treatments we promised delivery of the sandwich with a time lag (i.e., exactly one 
week later) in addition to exogenously varying hunger levels. A comparison of the 
before- and after-lunch WTP values in treatments where delivery of the product is in the 
future and in treatments where delivery of the product is right after the auction gives us 
an indication on the mediation of hunger on projection bias (if any). Our experiment was 
conducted in Madrid, Spain.  
Our between-subjects design involved 6 treatments in 12 sessions. To control for 
hunger levels we conducted sessions at two different times of the day: before lunch (6 
sessions) and after lunch (6 sessions). In Spain, lunch is the main meal and unlikely to be 
skipped, and following local habits for lunch, the schedules set for the experiments were 
at 1 pm (before lunch) and at 3 pm (after lunch). For obvious reasons, we expected more 
hungry participants in the first case and less hungry participants in the second case. As 
mentioned previously, although the timing of the sessions were scheduled so as to have 
“hungry” and “satiated” participants, subjects were also asked questions pertaining to the 
time since their last meal. In an attempt to have similar meal situations for all 
participants, the experiments were carried out in the middle of the week (Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays, and Thursdays), to avoid potential effects of “weekend leftovers” that 
participants may bring on Mondays or special weekend plans on Fridays.  
We also varied the time of delivery of the product to the highest bidders. In some 
sessions subjects received the food product immediately after the session (as is standard 
practice in auctions), while in other sessions delivery of the product occurred exactly one 
week later at the same time of the day. Highest bidders in the delayed delivery sessions 
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received a coupon with which they could redeem their product from the experimenters. 
Subjects were assured that the products would be available when they redeemed their 
coupons the following week. To test the effect of imposing a commitment cost on 
subjects’ valuation, half of the sessions that promised delivery of the good one week later 
required up-front payment for the good while the other half of the sessions required 
payment of the good upon delivery. The experimental design used in the study is depicted 
in table 1.  
Two hundred and fifty-two subjects participated in the lab experiment. Each 
subject participated in only one session. The size of the groups varied from 18 to 22 
subjects per session and each session lasted about an hour. Subjects were recruited 
through an announcement placed at the University of XX (removed for peer review; to be 
adjusted upon publication). Although the announcement was open to everybody, the great 
majority of participants were students from the university. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to a session for the study.  
The product of the auction was carefully chosen so that it would be a typical and 
widely accepted lunch product and perfectly known to subjects. Consequently, a ham and 
cheese sandwich was used in the auction. We chose a perishable food product so that 
subjects knew they were bidding for a product intended for immediate consumption, and 
consequently to make subjects’ current hunger status relevant to bidding behavior. To 
elicit subjects’ WTP, a fourth-price Vickrey auction was employed. Considering the size 
of the session groups and the likelihood of disengaging some of the participants due to 
the small number of winners, the fourth-price auction was regarded as a compromise 
between a second-price auction and a random nth-price auction for engaging off-margin 
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bidders.  Shogren et al. (2001) found that the second-price auction worked better for on-
margin bidders while the random nth-price auction worked better for off-margin bidders. 
Since the rules of the auction are somewhat complicated, we spent a significant amount 
of time educating and training the subjects about the auction mechanism. After arriving at 
the room reserved for the sessions, subjects were randomly seated. They were given an 
acceptance form and they received 10 euros (€) for taking part in the study, which they 
could use in the actual auction. A training phase with the auction mechanism was then 
conducted where the experimenter thoroughly explained how a fourth-price auction 
works. Subjects then took a short test regarding the procedure. The monitor explained the 
correct answers afterwards and made sure that all subjects completely understood the 
auction mechanism. Additionally, we conducted a “practice auction” to further show 
subjects how the auction works. In this practice auction, subjects had to bid in three real 
practice rounds for another product. The monitor emphasized that these rounds were real; 
that one binding round would be randomly chosen at the end of these rounds and that the 
highest bidders would actually have to pay for the products. The practice auction was 
identical for all sessions and was not part of the treatment design. The only purpose was 
to demonstrate to subjects how a fourth-price auction works. The experimental treatments 
were only applied to the ham and cheese sandwich. All transactions were completed at 
the end of the experiment. Subjects who participated in the “future delivery of the 
sandwich” treatments were informed about this specific procedure, just before the ham 
and sandwich auction started. 
After getting fully familiarized with the auction mechanism and procedures, 
subjects were shown a ham and cheese sandwich packed in a brandless package. 
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Although this product was familiar to all participants, they were asked to pass it around 
and inspect it closely prior to the auction as if it were a product they would know less 
about (Alfnes 2007). Since it is possible that exposure to food during the experiment can 
increase hunger, all subjects were exposed to the products in the same amount of time. 
Participants in the “present” treatment were told that a sandwich would be delivered to 
each of the highest bidders right after the auction while participants in the “future” 
treatments were informed that a sandwich would be delivered to each of the highest 
bidders in one week. The monitor made clear to subjects in the “future” treatments that 
the winners of the auction each would be getting a fresh sandwich one week later. 
Depending on the treatment selected, subjects in the “future” treatments were also 
informed that they would be required to pay for their sandwiches immediately after the 
auction or at pick-up one week later. The participants then bid in five real auction rounds 
for a sandwich. After all rounds were finished, a binding round was then randomly 
chosen to determine the final highest bidders of the auction.  
The participants were also asked to fill out a questionnaire that included socio-
demographic- and health-related questions as well as specific questions about their 
hunger level. Questions about subjects’ preferences for ham and cheese sandwiches as 
well as their frequency of consumption were also included.  
 
Econometric analysis and results 
 
Figure 1 displays the mean and median bids across rounds. Subjects in the sessions 
before lunch (1 pm) were willing to pay a higher price than subjects in the after lunch 
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treatments. In addition, subjects bidding to buy the sandwich immediately after the 
session (Present Treatment) bid higher than those bidding to buy the sandwich one week 
later (Future Treatment).  
Mean and median bids for those who participated in the future treatments, broken 
down by when the payment for the sandwich was required and time of the session in the 
day, are shown in figure 2. Subjects who had to pay in the future show no difference in 
mean or median bids when comparing the before-lunch and the after-lunch sessions. This 
is an indication that when no commitment cost was imposed on bidding behavior, hunger 
status does not significantly affect bids. On the other hand, when subjects had to pay 
immediately after the session (pay now) for the sandwich that was going to be delivered 
one week later, they bid much lower when in the after-lunch session (when they are likely 
to be satiated) than when in the before-lunch session (when they are likely to be hungry).  
 Evidence of projection bias is depicted in figures 3 and 4 where the kernel density 
estimates of bidding behavior in the present and future treatments, respectively, are 
shown. The effect of hunger on bids in the present treatments (i.e., sandwich is delivered 
right after the auction) are depicted in figure 3. As shown, the distribution of bids in the 
before-lunch treatment is shifted more to the right. This implies that when subjects are 
(likely) hungry, they bid more for the sandwich. The left part of Figure 4 shows the effect 
of hunger in the future treatments (i.e., sandwich is delivered with a time delay of one 
week) when payment was required in advance (i.e., right after the auction). Given that the 
distribution of the before-lunch bids is shifted to the right, this figure also implies the 
effect of hunger. However, given that the distribution is shifted more to the right as 
compared with figure 3, it shows that subjects over-predict their future hunger status. 
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Similarly, it seems that subjects under-predict their level of satiation in the future, since 
the distribution of bids in the after-lunch treatment is shifted much more to the left as 
compared with figure 3. The difference in the gaps of the two distributions (before- and 
after-lunch) in the present and future treatments is evidence of projection bias. Trivially, 
the right panel of figure 4 shows that without commitment costs imposed in the auction, 
hunger status does not affect bids. Distributions of bids in the before- and after-lunch 
treatments are considerably overlapping. 
To quantify the effect of projection bias and also explore whether the differences 
discussed so far hold under the scrutiny of conditional analysis, we estimated a random 
effects regression model, where the regression function is specified as: 
(1)  
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
7 8
9 2 10 3 11 4 12 5
i i i i
i i i i
it
i i i i
i i i i
b b Future b AfterLunch b FuturePay b LastMeal
b Future AfterLunch b FuturePay AfterLunch
Bid
b FuturePay LastMeal b Future LastMeal
b Round b Round b Round b Round
                
it ie u  
 
where i is a subscript for the individuals and t is a subscript indicating the time 
dimension. The random error term ui is heterogeneity-specific to the individual and is 
constant over all time periods. The random error term eit is specific to a particular 
observation and incorporates the time dimension into the model. With respect to the 
variables, Future is a dummy indicating whether subjects were bidding to get the 
sandwich one week later, AfterLunch is a dummy for Treatments that were conducted at 3 
pm, FuturePay is a dummy indicating whether in the Future treatments subjects had to 
pay one week later or right after the auction, LastMeal is time since last meal and Round 
are round dummies. We estimate this specification with and without 
demographics/attitudinal variables, as shown in table 2, and find that results are fairly 
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robust. The demographics/attitudinal variable included in one of the specifications 
include variables consistent with the variable name: dummy for males, age, dummy for 
students, income dummies, self-reported body mass index (BMI), dummy for whether the 
respondent likes cheese and ham sandwiches (LikeHam) and dummies for how frequently 
subjects eat ham and cheese sandwiches.  
Equation (1) includes several interaction terms to help capture the differential 
effects evident in figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. To test whether the model with the interaction 
terms fits the data significantly better, we fitted the random effects model with maximum 
likelihood (ML) and performed a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. 1 The model with the 
interaction terms fits the data significantly better (LR=35.96, p-value=0.00 and 
LR=34.63, p-value=0.00 for models  (1) and (2) of table 2, respectively).  
Coefficient estimates from equation (1) are shown in table 2. However, 
interpretation of the interacted variables is not straightforward. Marginal effects for each 
of the interacted variables needs to take into account the other interacted variables as well 
(Drichoutis and Nayga, 2011). For the Future variable this would be: 
(2)  1 5 8
Bid b b AfterLunch b LastMeal
Future
    . 
Expression (2) can then be evaluated for AfterLunch=1 or 0:  
(3)  1 5 6
1AfterLunch
Bid b b b LastMeal
Future 
     and 1 60AfterLunch
Bid b b LastMeal
Future 
   . 
Expression (3) is evaluated for the the median value of LastMeal. Similarly for the 
AfterLunch variable we have: 
                                                            
1 The ML estimator has the same properties as the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and results 
using the ML estimator versus the FGLS are practically identical. 
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(4) 2 5 6
Bid b b Future b FuturePay
AfterLunch
     
which gives rise to three marginal effects: 
(5) 2 5 6
1,
1
Future
FuturePay
Bid b b b
AfterLunch  
     , 2 51,
0
Future
FuturePay
Bid b b
AfterLunch  
    and 
 2
0,
0
Future
FuturePay
Bid b
AfterLunch  
   
Similar effects are in place for the FuturePay and LastMeal variables. Marginal effects 
for the interacted variables appear in Table 3. These results largely confirm what is seen 
by observation of figures 1 to 4. For example, subjects who bid to buy the sandwich for 
future consumption (one week later) bid less than subjects who bid to buy the sandwich 
right after the auction.2 Subjects who bid to get the sandwich in the Future before lunch 
bid 0.39€ (0.38€ based on model (2)) lower than subjects who bid to get the sandwich 
immediately after the auction. Similarly, subjects who bid to get the sandwich in the 
Future after lunch bid 0.66€ lower than subjects who bid to get the sandwich 
immediately after the auction. Thus, the (negative) effect of getting the sandwich one 
week later is even larger when subjects are satiated at the time of the auction (-0.66€ vs. -
0.39€).  
One potential explanation for why subjects bid less when the sandwich is going to 
be delivered one week later is time discounting. Subjects are discounting the value of the 
sandwich one week later in present value. Another explanation that we cannot rule out 
(even though we took every precaution to reassure subjects this will not be the case) is 
                                                            
2 Note that the effect is evaluated at the median of the LastMeal variable (which captures how hungry 
someone is at the time of the auction). 
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uncertainty about delivery of the sandwich. If some subjects were uncertain about 
whether the experimenter would actually deliver the sandwich one week later as 
promised, then these subjects would be motivated to shade their bids to account for the 
risk of not actually getting the sandwich. If we couple these two explanations with 
satiation at the time of the auction (after lunch sessions) which makes a sandwich look 
less appealing, shading a bid by (on average) as much as 66 cents sounds sensible. In all, 
the first two rows of table 3 show that subjects value the sandwich more when it is 
offered for immediate consumption and value it even more if this occurs before lunch, 
even when controlling for time since their last meal.  
The next three rows of table 3 evaluate the effect of hunger (before- vs. after-
lunch sessions) for the different treatments. Some studies suggest that people have strong 
preferences about the time of the day when they consume particular foods (Gilbert and 
Wilson 2007; Kramer, Rock, and Engell 1992; Birch, Billman, and Richards 1984). 
When in a satiated state, people consider the prospect of a meal not very appetizing if 
they have just finished eating (Gilbert 2006) or are less likely to purchase food than those 
who have yet to eat (Hoffman et al. 1993).  Although previous studies focus specifically 
on the “time of the day” effect on bidding behavior by conducting auctions throughout 
the day (Morawetz, De Groote, and Chege 2011; Rutsaert et al. 2009; Hoffman et al. 
1993; Menkhaus et al. 1992), we use the two-hour difference between auctions to allow 
for variation in hunger, not to measure “time of day” impact. 
The effect of the before- and after-lunch treatments is a key effect because it 
allows us to quantify the effect of projection bias. The estimate of -0.34€ (-0.36€ for 
model (2)) is the quantified effect of hunger in the present treatments and roughly 
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corresponds to the difference of distributions in figure 3. This implies that satiated 
subjects are, on average, willing to pay 0.34€ less than hungry subjects for the sandwich. 
When subjects have to predict their future WTP based on their current tastes (current 
level of hunger), the effect of hunger almost doubles to 0.61€ (0.65€ based on model (2)). 
This corresponds to the left part of figure 4 and is the result of over-predicting hunger and 
under-predicting satiation. Thus, the difference between these two effects (0.61€ vs. 
0.34€) can be attributed to projection bias. Finally, hunger levels do not significantly 
affect bids when subjects are bidding in the future delivery treatments and do not have to 
feel the costs of their decision right away (i.e., future payment treatment). This last result 
corresponds to the right part of figure 4. 
The effect of paying in the future for the sandwich that was going to be delivered 
one week later versus paying in advance is only significant in the after lunch sessions.  
Subjects increase their bids by almost 60 cents (63 cents for model(2)) when they have to 
pay upon delivery of the sandwich (and not right after the end of the auction) and when 
they are satiated. The difference for hungry participants is neither economically nor 
statistically significant.  
The last three rows of table 3 show the effect of time since last meal on bids conditional 
on the treatment variables. The largest effect is observed for the present treatments; for 
every hour since their last meal, subjects increase their bids by 0.05 cents. Interestingly, 
time since last meal negatively affects bids in the treatments that promised delivery of the 
sandwich one week later, although the effects are much smaller. Perhaps there is a 
mechanism in place that acts proactively for those with low hunger levels (bid more to 
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get the sandwich in the future in case I get hungry) and protectively for those with high 
hunger levels (bid more to get the sandwich now to satiate my appetite). 
Regarding the remaining variables, the round dummy variables are neither 
economically nor statistically significant. This is also evident in figures 1 and 2, where 
lines are quite stable over rounds. There is a slight decrease of bids in round five which 
could be attributed to end game effects. Some demographic effects are also evident in 
table 2. For example, age has a positive statistically significant effect on bidding, and 
students (Student) bid more than non-students by €0.13. Other variables like income, 
Body Mass Index (BMI), liking ham sandwiches and eating ham sandwiches regularly 
are not significant. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the past few years, there has been a growing trend towards integrating behavioral 
evidence from psychology to the usual lines of economic research. Much has been 
accomplished on this front since Rabin’s 1998 article in the highly influential “Journal of 
Economic Literature”, where he discussed the importance of linking Psychology and 
Economics. DellaVigna (2009) then added that “hopefully, ten years from now, we will 
be able to assess quantitatively which psychological factors matter in which decisions”. 
In this study, we tried to explore how (projection) biases that are not predicted by 
classical microeconomic theory affect subjects’ valuation within the context of 
experimental economic auctions and how this effect is mediated by hunger and 
preference for immediate gratification. Loewenstein (1996) states that when people are in 
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what is called a “hot” state (e.g., angry, hungry, or in pain), it is difficult to imagine how 
they would feel or what they might do if they were in a “cold” state. These gaps lead to 
errors in predicting behavior. One implication of this projection bias is that people behave 
differently when in hunger or satiation. In fact, there is considerable research 
demonstrating that hunger not only influences taste evaluations (e.g., Scott 1990; Fantino 
1984), but also influences attitudes towards food (Lozano, Crites, and Aikman1999) and 
attitudes towards shopping (Nisbett and Kanouse 1968; Mela, Aaron, and Gatenby 1997; 
Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson 2002). For example, people may change their behavioral 
intentions towards the purchase and consumption of food when they are hungry.  
In this study, we examined the role of projection bias in experimental auctions by 
assessing the bidding behavior of hungry and non-hungry subjects on a perishable food 
product that was going to be given either right after the auction or in one week’s time. 
Hence, we investigated not only the role of hunger but also the role of immediate 
gratification in subjects’ valuations. Our results generally suggest that subjects who are 
offered the sandwich right after the auction are willing to pay more than those who had to 
wait one week to get their product. Time discounting and perhaps some uncertainty on 
whether the sandwich was actually going to be delivered could rationalize this result. 
Preferences tend to be clearly present-biased due to a need for immediate gratification 
and doubts about future necessities.  
On the projection bias issue, we found that when subjects have to predict their 
future WTP from their current tastes, they tend to over-predict their hunger and under-
predict satiation. Thus, the effect of hunger on bids almost doubles due to projection bias. 
Subjects are willing to pay 34 cents more when they are hungry as compared to when 
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they are satiated but this effect almost doubles to 61 cents when subjects have to predict 
their future tastes.  
 Our findings suggest the important roles of hunger in examination of projection 
bias in experimental auctions. Our results have significant implications for future 
experimental auction designs. Experimental auctions are becoming a very popular tool 
used by economists to elicit consumers` WTP for food products. For perishable food 
products that are intended for immediate consumption, projection bias is less likely to be 
an issue although hunger would still play a significant role in shaping bidding behavior. 
However, for food products that can be stored for longer time and therefore intended for 
future consumption, projection bias can be an issue. As we show, current tastes 
significantly affects bidding behavior of a planned future consumption. If not taken into 
account, part of bids will include biased estimates of consumer preferences. Our results 
show that projection bias is significant even for one week’s time. Our findings imply that 
both hunger levels and desire for immediate consumption (or conversely for delayed 
consumption) should be measured so that researchers using experimental auctions to 
examine food products can control for these factors in the WTP models.  
 Our results also have practical and important implications for marketing products. 
For example, results in this paper suggest that food delivery businesses (i.e., those that 
deliver food products from stores to specific locations such as homes) should strive to 
significantly reduce delivery times and not ask customers to pay well in advance of 
delivery. It might also be better to advertise or promote products before meals than right 
after meals. Results might also have implications on whether stores should allow taste 
tests in the store or not, since this could affect the level of hunger and quest for 
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immediate gratification among shoppers. This results corresponds to findings by Gilbert, 
Gill, and Wilson (2002), who showed that shoppers who were given a muffin to eat 
before entering a supermarket were more likely to restrict their purchases in their 
shopping list. 
While our findings are interesting and useful for designing future experimental 
auction studies involving food, we have to recognize that they are still based on specific 
contexts as in any experimental economics study. Specifically, our results are based on 
valuations for a familiar product. Future research should test the robustness of our 
findings with unfamiliar products. It is possible that the roles of hunger and immediate 
gratification could be less important when valuing products that are less familiar to 
subjects. For less familiar products, one could also test how experienced reward 
processes interact with hunger and immediate gratification by letting subjects taste a 
small sample of the food while deciding how much to bid, similar to one of the 
experiments conducted in Bushong et al. (2010). 
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Table 1. Experimental Design and Number of Subjects Participating Per Session 
  Time of Delivery of the Sandwich 
Total 
  After the 
auction 
One week after the auction 
   Subjects had to 
pay immediately 
after the auction 
Subjects had to 
pay one week 
after the auction 
Time of 
the day 
Before 
Lunch 
66 
3 sessions 
40 
2 sessions 
22 
1 session 
128 
After 
Lunch 
64 
3 sessions 
20 
1 session 
40 
2 sessions 
124 
Total 130 60 62 252 
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Table 2. Coefficient estimates from Random Effects Regression 
  (1) -2 
Constant 0.046 (0.302) 1.216** (0.080) 
Future -0.239* (0.124) -0.225* (0.126) 
AfterLunch -0.341** (0.079) -0.356** (0.081) 
FutureAfterLunch -0.268* (0.148) -0.291* (0.151) 
FuturePay -0.118 (0.145) -0.118 (0.147) 
FuturePayAfterLunch 0.702** (0.172) 0.727** (0.173) 
LastMeal 0.054** (0.018) 0.056** (0.018) 
FutureLastMeal -0.085** (0.025) -0.087** (0.025) 
FuturePayLastMeal 0.005 (0.027) 0.011 (0.027) 
Round2 -0.002 (0.020) 0.003 (0.020) 
Round3 -0.004 (0.020) 0.001 (0.020) 
Round4 -0.035* (0.020) -0.030 (0.020) 
Round5 -0.047** (0.020) -0.042** (0.020) 
Males -0.077 (0.059) - - 
Age 0.026** (0.006) - - 
Student 0.129* (0.073) - - 
Inc2 -0.028 (0.099) - - 
Inc3 0.115 (0.101) - - 
Inc4 -0.044 (0.109) - - 
BMI 0.015 (0.010) - - 
LikeHam 0.119 (0.133) - - 
FreqHam2 0.067 (0.074) - - 
FreqHam3 0.060 (0.077) - - 
FreqHam4 -0.015 (0.088)  - -  
N 1245 1255 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 3. Marginal effects for interacted variables  
 (1) (2) 
Future 
AfterLunch=1 -0.655** (0.107) -0.667** (0.108) 
AfterLunch=0 -0.387** (0.095) -0.377** (0.098) 
AfterLunch 
Future=1, FuturePay=1 0.093 (0.115) 0.081 (0.116) 
Future=1, FuturePay=0 -0.609** (0.125) -0.646** (0.127) 
Future=0, FuturePay=0 -0.341** (0.079) -0.356** (0.081) 
FuturePay AfterLunch=1 0.592** (0.117) 0.628** (0.116) 
AfterLunch=0 -0.110 (0.120) -0.099 (0.122) 
LastMeal 
Future=1,FuturePay=1 -0.026 (0.021) -0.020 (0.021) 
Future=1,FuturePay=0 -0.031* (0.017) -0.031* (0.018) 
Future=0,FuturePay=0 0.054** (0.018) 0.056** (0.018) 
 
N  1245 1255 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, and 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. 
For example, “Future, AfterLunch=1” refers to the effect of Future conditional on AfterLunch taking the 
value of 1.  Likewise, “AfterLunch, Future=1, FuturePay=0” captures the effect of timing of the session in 
the treatments that promised delivery of the good in the future and subjects had to pay in advance. 
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Figure 1. Mean and median bids across rounds 
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Figure 2. Mean and median bids across rounds for the future treatments 
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Figure 3. Kernel density estimates for bids in the present treatments 
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Figure 4. Kernel density estimates for bids in the future treatments 
  
